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Invisible Suffering
The Experience of Breathlessness
HAVI CAREL
This chapter presents a philosophical framework for the understanding of the 
expe-rience of breathlessness. I suggest that the experience of breathlessness 
is total and overwhelming to the sufferer, but also largely invisible to the 
outsider. How does this tension play itself out for the respiratory patient? How 
does this tension affect respiratory medicine and clinical work? How could 
the first-person experience of breathlessness be better understood? Can it 
be usefully harnessed in the clinic? And what can a distinctively philosophical 
analysis offer this process? These questions are explored in the chapter, in 
the hope of providing a sketch of such a philosophi-cal framework aimed at 
understanding this debilitating and common symptom. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. It begins with an overview 
of breathing and the symptom of breathlessness, and how breathlessness is 
inter-preted in the clinic and outside it. The second section provides a 
phenomenologi-cal account of breathlessness, moving away from 
understanding it as a medical symptom to understanding it as a broader 
existential, social, personal, cultural, and psychological phenomenon. The final 
section examines how such a philo-sophical framework may be operationalized 
in a respiratory clinic, providing some examples of its possible clinical uses.
What Is Breathlessness?
Breathing is a basic physiological process but also has deep cultural, spiritual, 
and personal meaning. It connects our inner and outer physical realms via 
the air 
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drawn into and expelled from the lungs. It is generally under autonomic control, 
but we also have some voluntary control over our breathing, and can override 
its “default settings” by holding our breath or otherwise consciously manipulat-
ing it. Breathing plays a central role in cultural and spiritual practices such as 
meditation and is also associated with our state of mind and in particular our 
well-being and emotional state. Breathing’s pathological derivative, breathlessness, 
is a major symptom in both respiratory and cardiac disease, as well as in anxiety 
disorders and some disorders that affect the chest muscles. Whilst the physiology 
of breathlessness is well understood, the subjective experiences of breathing and 
breathlessness are understudied and our vocabulary and concepts with which to 
understand them are limited. 
Breathing contains interesting tensions and juxtapositions. For example, 
it takes place continuously but mostly unconsciously. It is essential to life but 
can be artificially sustained despite the absence of consciousness. Much of the 
time we are unaware of it, but when it goes wrong (e.g., in respiratory disease), 
it takes up our entire attention. In some disorders, for example panic disorders, 
breathing itself can become the focus of pathological ideation and fears. When 
we exert ourselves physically, breathing becomes labored, eventually leading to 
breathlessness. In such situations, our breath becomes the focus of attention, and 
the experience can be uncomfortable. In cases in which breathlessness is patho-
logical, experiencing it can be much more extreme and become debilitating, life 
limiting, and the focus of much anxiety. 
Breathing is also intimately connected to emotion: surprise or horror make 
us gasp, hearty laughter leaves us gasping for breath, crying involves involuntary 
short, sharp inhalations. Breathing is richly modulated by emotional experience, 
be it pleasurable or painful. The lungs are the only bodily site (other than the 
skin) where interior and exterior spaces are in constant exchange. We breathe 
in the air and what it contains, extract the oxygen we need, and expel carbon 
dioxide. The air around us, with its pollutants, odors, humidity, and heat, becomes 
internalized briefly, connecting us to the environment and exposing our lungs 
to pollutants, irritants, and potential sources of infection. The lungs are thus 
vulnerable and open to the external environment in a way that does not occur 
with other internal organs.
The very idea of breath is suffused with metaphor. The German poet Rainer 
Maria Rilke described breath as “an invisible poem.” Breath takes place in the chest, 
the center of our body; metaphorically, it is the core of life: our first and last breaths 
mark life’s beginning and end, and breathing continuously happens throughout 
life. However, biomedicine does not acknowledge how everyday experience and 
its meanings are implicated in breathing, and thus neglects to incorporate this 
rich vein into its understanding of breathlessness. Metaphor, emotion, and the 
spiritual and existential dimensions are not part of the language of the clinic, yet 
they are a central part of the experience of breathing and of breathlessness. This 
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tension between medical and cultural or intuitive understandings of breathing 
and breathlessness lies at the heart of this chapter.1
Turning to breathlessness, we can see that it is a major symptom that 
appears in a number of very common diseases with high morbidity and mortality 
rates. According to improving and integrating respiratory services, 25 percent of 
attendees to emergency departments, 62 percent of elderly people, and almost all 
people with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) (around 95 percent) 
report breathlessness.2 Breathlessness is a key symptom in a number of common 
and serious diseases, such as heart failure and lung cancer, as well as in COPD, 
a condition with an increasing global prevalence owing to its association with 
smoking. Air pollution has been an important cause of respiratory disease and 
breathlessness historically, and women in developing countries often develop 
COPD as a result of time spent by cooking fires.3 The World Health Organization 
currently ranks COPD as the fourth most common cause of death in developed 
countries, and it is estimated that it will become the third largest global killer by 
2020.4 COPD affects an estimated 3.7 million people in the UK, but only 900,000 
of them are aware of having the condition.5 
Gysels and Higginson have described both the symptom of breathlessness, 
and the patients suffering from it, as invisible. This invisibility stems from the 
fact that breathlessness is a condition that usually has an insidious onset and is 
often attributed by those who experience it to aging, lack of exercise, or smok-
ing.6 The stigma associated with smoking is also a factor encouraging people to 
hide their condition or its severity. Clinicians, who are increasingly less likely to 
visit people in their own homes, are unaware of the complex needs, limitations, 
and adjustments required when living with breathlessness.7 And of course either 
moderate or severe breathlessness has a dramatic impact on mobility and can cause 
people to go out less, socialize less, and hence be seen less. All of these factors 
contribute to the invisibility of breathlessness and breathless people.
The traditional clinical approach to dealing with a symptom is to find out 
what is causing it, treat it, and wait for the patient to improve. This rarely happens 
in chronic breathlessness. As Johnson and colleagues argue, chronic breathlessness 
frequently results from incurable, often long-term, progressive conditions, and 
the symptom persists despite treatment of the underlying condition.8 They have 
termed such breathlessness “refractory” and suggest that the attitude of clinicians 
and patients toward it is one of helplessness, with clinicians holding the view that 
“nothing more can be done,” and patients feeling more helpless and hopeless. This 
leads to hopelessness and lack of attention to the symptom from both parties. 
Patients may no longer report increasing distress to their doctors; clinicians may 
fail to ask about the problems caused by the breathlessness, as they feel unable 
to help. The problem of invisibility is compounded by a sense of helplessness.9 
When we reflect on our breathing or try to describe the experience of breath-
ing, we filter this reflection and experience through a rich set of influences that 
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has a long cultural history. These influences can determine, in part, our reactions 
to a diagnosis of a respiratory illness, and how we might understand it. When 
this lay understanding approaches the clinic, it comes up against a biomedical 
view of breathing. The lay perspective is met by a particular series of prescribed 
questions (e.g., breathlessness questionnaires) against which patients must assess 
their breathlessness and through which their understanding begins to change. 
That change may be temporary, until they leave the clinic or hospital and return 
home. But the influence of the biomedical view may be more sustained. For 
example, as a result of listening to a clinical discourse, a patient might adopt a 
deficit approach to her breathlessness, having been shown through lung function 
tests what percentage of predicted lung function she has. She might begin to 
experience her breathlessness as more anomalous and shameful than before. She 
may feel alienated from the physiological body that has let her down. The ways 
in which the subjective experience is shaped by the clinical gaze is another aspect 
of the experience of breathlessness that phenomenology can usefully illuminate. 
I therefore now turn to a phenomenology of breathlessness.
A Phenomenological Account of Breathlessness
A phenomenology of breathlessness can reveal the nature of the experience and 
its qualia. It can also structure the experience using phenomenological concepts, 
as I do below. The first distinction I would like to make as the foundation of this 
phenomenological description is between pathological and normal breathlessness. 
Normal breathlessness is the kind of breathlessness a healthy person experiences 
upon exertion. It may involve heavier, deeper breathing that is also speeded up. 
But regardless of the level of exertion, in a healthy person oxygen saturation 
levels remain above 97 percent; such exertion is not dangerous and does not 
lead to loss of control, such as fainting. Experientially, healthy breathlessness 
does not lead to feelings of panic, anxiety, or fear. It is not a total experience 
and does not remove its bearer from the familiar everyday sense of her body 
and of herself. In fact, normal breathlessness can be associated with enjoyable 
bodily exertion as well as with a sense of challenge and joy (e.g., in exercise, 
running, or dancing). 
Pathological breathlessness, of the kind experienced by people with impaired 
lung or heart function, is entirely different. It, too, involves heavier, faster breath-
ing, but unlike healthy breathlessness, it does not deliver the required amount of 
oxygen to support bodily exertion. The gap between the amount of oxygen required 
for the activity and the amount available determines the level of incapacitation 
and the acuteness of the breathlessness. A person with severe respiratory disease 
might not be able to walk or bend down to pick up a pen from the floor. At 
its worst, pathological breathlessness is debilitating and causes severe disability. 
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In pathological breathlessness, blood oxygen levels can drop severely, leading to 
dizziness, fainting, shaking, excessive sweating, and a sense of doom. It is a total 
and overwhelming experience of loss of control and is acutely unpleasant. It 
removes the breathless person from the normal course of events and can cause 
deep anxiety, panic attack, and trauma.
Such pathological breathlessness is characterized by several core features: it 
is an acute and extremely unpleasant experience that can lead to severe distress, 
but not pain (although evidence from brain-imaging studies shows that the same 
neural pathways are activated in breathlessness and in pain.10 It is an overwhelm-
ing, but as discussed above, invisible sensation. Unlike other, more dramatic, 
symptoms (e.g., bleeding, fainting, seizures) that can be easily observed, breath-
lessness is hard to see. This is in line with the characterization of breathlessness 
as an “invisible disability.”11 We can add a third layer to Gysels and Higginson’s 
twofold view of breathlessness, saying that patients and disease are invisible. I 
suggest that the experience of breathlessness is also invisible. Although you might 
see a person standing and looking uncomfortable, often they are not panting, 
talking, or making any noise. It is therefore extremely hard to discern the extreme 
nature of this experience and how discomfiting and upsetting it is. In extreme 
cases, breathlessness and accompanying oxygen desaturation can lead to feelings 
of nausea, dizziness, faintness, and incontinence.
Some first-person articulations of pathological breathlessness include sufferers 
saying that they feel trapped, as if they are about to die, that they are suffocat-
ing or drowning, and that these feelings are intimately associated with feelings 
of panic and loss of control. Here is a first-person account of the experience of 
breathlessness:
Trapped. That is what breathlessness feels like. Trapped in the web of 
uncertainty, bodily doubt, practical obstacles, and fear. The deepest fear 
you can think of. The fear of suffocation, of being unable to breathe, 
the fear of collapsing, desaturated to the point of respiratory failure.12
Let us now ground this experience in a phenomenological framework, in order to 
flesh it out more fully and to orientate the experience to a rich phenomenological 
description.13 On a phenomenological account, embodiment determines possibili-
ties. Merleau-Ponty famously draws on Heidegger’s notion of existence as “being 
able to be” [Seinkönnen], and formulates this ability as grounded in motility and 
embodied action.14 In breathlessness, these possibilities are truncated, curtailed, 
or altogether closed off. As a result, the world shrinks and becomes hostile, as the 
pathologically breathless person’s ability to freely navigate it, move within it, and 
experience it shrinks. These truncated possibilities restrict choices and freedom 
and often dictate what is and is not possible, and what is and is not worth the 
considerable additional effort that carrying out the choice entails for a person with 
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restricted mobility. As a result, projects that were previously open and executed 
with freedom become delimited by restriction. 
For example, if I want to go for a walk after dinner to stretch my legs, I 
stroll until I am satisfied, and then I return home. In effect, I have walked without 
bounds. But for the respiratory patient, the walk must be carefully planned, with 
gradient, distance, and terrain considered, amount of ambulatory oxygen to be 
taken calculated, and frequent stops for rest built in. The very same activity—going 
for a walk—becomes restricted, narrowed, riddled with discomfort and worry, 
and of course this changes the nature of the experience. The shape of the walk 
has been entirely dictated by the illness, and is therefore not experienced as free.
As a result, a vicious cycle of self-limitation may ensure, leading to reduced 
fitness caused by deconditioning, which itself is caused by the reduced activity 
level. This cycle often leads to feelings of helplessness, despair, fear, anxiety, and 
depression. Any activity needs to be carefully planned, and during its execution, 
constant attention is paid to the breath: am I desaturating? Do I need to increase 
the oxygen flow? Will this walk be too exhausting for me? Will I be able to walk 
back? Will I have enough oxygen? The constant explicit consideration places the 
activity in the shadow of the breathing and the experience of breathlessness, and 
the way in which it is constantly managed and heeded changes the nature of any 
activity. It becomes secondary to the breath and the management of breathlessness.
In other words, the body loses the transparency it normally has in health. 
Thus, for example, Jean-Paul Sartre writes about the transparency of health; Drew 
Leder discusses the absent body in health; and Leriche speaks of health as a state 
lived in “the silence of the organs.”15 In respiratory illness, this putative transpar-
ency16 disappears, while the body, as Leder would put it, “dys-appears,” that is, 
it appears, but in a state of dysfunction, aberration, attracting negative attention 
and requiring treatment, strict regimentation, observation, and special measures.17
One way of characterizing the type of experiences that can occur in 
breathlessness is through the notion of bodily doubt.18 Normally we have a tacit 
underlying sense of bodily certainty that characterizes everyday embodied experi-
ence. But in illness this certainty breaks down and is replaced by bodily doubt. 
This sense of bodily doubt is the breakdown of this tacit certainty, and leads 
to a radically modified embodied experience. It does this in three ways: loss of 
continuity, loss of transparency, and loss of faith in one’s body.19 Breathlessness is 
a core example of this breakdown. In cases of pathological breathlessness there is 
a break from past ability to exert oneself and to perform actions freely. The body 
loses its transparency, as discussed above. And finally, bodily doubt is characterized 
by a loss of faith in one’s body. A body that has broken down, disappointed, or 
otherwise failed the ill person is likely to give rise to feelings of deep alienation, 
suspicion, and lack of trust.
Because of the breakdown of bodily trust, and the loss of certainty and 
transparency, in the presence of pathological breathlessness daily activities become 
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a problem. The sense of “I can,” which Husserl suggests characterizes our embodied 
stance toward the world, changes into a new stance, of “I no longer can,” or “I 
was once able to but am no longer.”20 Our connection to the world “goes limp,” 
as Merleau-Ponty puts it.21
There are a few further ways in which the transparency (or relative trans-
parency) of the body changes in pathological breathlessness. First, there now is 
artificial and conscious engagement with breath. The modulation of breath (and of 
oxygen flow, if used) becomes explicit, and the natural, tacit, way in which breath 
is normally modulated is lost. The habitual body described by Merleau-Ponty 
becomes habitually breathless.22 Habits are changed, bodily repertoires shrink, 
activities that were once enticing, even fun, are now passed over as too difficult 
or too tiring. Behavior is now modulated by both motor and psychological self-
censorship: certain movements (e.g., bending) are avoided; exertion is carefully 
weighed and planned, so as to avoid overexertion; plans are made, then remade, 
changed, and often cancelled, if they require too much effort or lead to anxiety 
about keeping up, possible fatigue, and social embarrassment. This process takes 
place on both a motor and a conscious level. On the motor level, movements 
that were once easy and natural but have become difficult, challenging, or lead 
to severe breathlessness are avoided:
Every time I tried—and failed—to do something that was too strenu-
ous, my body stoically registered the failure and thereafter avoided 
that action. The change was subtle, because this happened by stealth. 
The miraculous result created by my body’s adaptive abilities was 
that I stopped feeling so acutely all the things I could not do. They 
were quietly removed from my bodily repertoire, in a way so subtle 
I hardly noticed it.23
To summarize, in pathological breathlessness, explicitness of action becomes 
second nature on both a motor and a conscious level. This creates a new terrain, 
in which freedom and obliviousness are replaced by hesitation and limitation. 
In this terrain, distances increase: it is full of barriers, disruption, and unantici-
pated obstacles. This leads to the breathless person being excluded from shared 
norms; concepts like “nearby” and “easy” no longer tally with the concepts used 
by healthy people. In this way illness disrupts meaning structures and sufferers 
must rebuild meaning and regain their foothold on the everyday. Of course, in 
cases of progressive breathlessness, that everyday shifts as disease progresses. The 
lost opportunities and relinquished activities require a continuous reworking of 
the boundaries of the possible. 
I said above that everyday activities become a problem, something requir-
ing explicit attention, planning, and thought. In a similar way, the body itself 
also becomes a problem, an obstacle, a stranger, because embodied normality 
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is disrupted. As philosopher S. Kay Toombs writes, illness is a series of losses. 
The losses she attributes to illness experiences in general are especially apt in the 
case of breathlessness, because breath is needed for any and all activities. So the 
loss of breath—being breath-less—results in the following losses: first, there is a 
loss of wholeness, a loss of bodily integrity, of a reflective sense of wellness. The 
awareness and anticipation of loss also cause distress. Second, there is a loss of 
certainty, which is pervasive and irreparable. Third, a loss of control. Breathlessness 
causes anxiety, dysautonomy, worry about and preoccupation with controlling one’s 
body, one’s breath, one’s speech, and one’s actions. Fourth, sufferers experience a 
loss of freedom to act; and fifth, a loss of the familiar world.24
Let us know turn to the final section, in which I consider the implications 
of this analysis for the clinic, and suggest several ways in which a phenomeno-
logical analysis of breathlessness can be utilized in the clinic.
Phenomenology in the Clinic
There are several ways in which inviting the first-person phenomenological 
perspective into the clinic can be important and useful. I suggest that this is 
particularly the case for breathlessness, for several reasons. First, there is a noted 
discrepancy between objective and subjective measurements of lung function; this 
has been reported in the literature and causes physicians difficulties in predicting 
how patients will continue to cope with everyday living. Patients often over- or 
underperform, relative to their objective lung function measurement,25 and this 
makes treatment and the allocation of resources such as social care difficult and 
inaccurate. 
Second, as discussed above, breathlessness is an invisible symptom. Seeing 
someone stop to catch her breath tells you nothing of the internal turmoil, panic, 
and mounting discomfort she may be experiencing. Without patient reports about 
the experience, breathlessness will continue to be invisible and poorly understood. 
Making such accounts available and giving them prominence in public and patient 
fora, decision-making committees and other consultative process will contribute 
to reducing the invisibility of both symptom and patients, many of whom are 
housebound, or find leaving the house difficult, and are therefore less visible to 
both public and health professionals. 
Another reason it is important to articulate the phenomenology of breathless-
ness is because it gives an opportunity to demonstrate the breadth and diversity 
of experiences of breathlessness. In particular, there are compelling accounts of 
well-being experienced within the constraints of ill health, and this opens the door 
to viewing wellness despite breathlessness as both achievable and significant.26 
Barbara Paterson proposes the “shifting perspectives model,” in which the illness 
(in this case the breathlessness) can shift from foreground to background during 
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periods of stable disease, and back to the foreground during disease progression 
or symptom exacerbation.27 The important thing is to note the possibility of the 
breathlessness receding into the background and no longer affecting the breathless 
person’s well-being, although she still has limited mobility and other restrictions.
Another reason to promote the presence of first-person accounts of breath-
lessness is that, like all illnesses, breathlessness is experienced very differently from 
the inside (first-person perspective) and from the outside (second- or third-person 
perspective). Health professionals might have an intimate acquaintance with the 
causes and process of a particular disease, or treatment options and prognosis, 
and of the symptoms, but they still lack the first-person knowledge of what it is 
like to experience a particular disease. This experience can be transformative in 
two ways: it can reveal to you what it is like to suffer from pathological breath-
lessness, and it can also transform you in deep ways through the experience of 
a serious illness.28 The “insider” perspective on breathlessness can be instructive 
and edifying for the health professional who does not have first-hand experience 
of the disease, and hence remains an “outsider” to that experience. This can also 
help with the discrepancy between the perceived ease of task (for the health 
professional) and the challenge it presents to a patient.
Finally, phenomenological reflection has a positive force. It can help suf-
ferers to order and discern confusing experiences, and can provide a reflective 
stance from which to think about the bewildering, painful, and sad experiences of 
illness and of breathlessness. I have developed a “patient toolkit” that uses philo-
sophical ideas to support patients in making sense of their illness. The toolkit has 
three steps: (1) stripping away the sociocultural understanding of illness to make 
room for individual interpretations; (2) viewing illness from different perspectives 
(thematizing) to enable patients to understand it as a multidimensional process. 
Thematizing reveals illness as it may appear to the ill person, carer/s and health 
professionals; and (3) considering how illness changes the ill person’s way of being.29 
To conclude, accounts of breathlessness can help overcome the gulf sepa-
rating the healthy person’s understanding of the term and the harsh reality of 
pathological breathlessness. As Elaine Scarry notes: 
[. . .] when one speaks about “one’s own physical pain” and about 
“another person’s physical pain,” one might almost appear to be 
speaking about two distinct orders of events. For the person whose 
pain it is, it is “effortlessly” grasped; while for the person outside the 
sufferer’s body, what is “effortless” is not grasping it.30 
The unsharability of unique experiences such as extreme pain or pathological 
breathlessness undermines care and knowledge. Insofar as we do not attempt to 
reconcile the clinical perspective with that of the breathless patient, breathlessness 
remains opaque, invisible, and refractory. Health professionals are not exempt from 
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holding both unconscious and conscious biases and stereotypes and from falling 
prey to stigmatization of disease and to certain diseases in particular.31 Patients’ 
invisibility and suffering can be exacerbated by this stigma and by their attempts 
to mask their symptoms, as they are trailed by tacit assumptions about their life 
and choices (e.g., that they were smokers, that they are contagious). 
The feelings of pity, terror, and denial that many people experience when 
they encounter people with respiratory disease may also inflect health profession-
als’ conduct and attitudes. Hence another reason for bringing them into close and 
sustained contact with sufferers’ accounts of their experiences. The difficulties they 
experience are lived in the first person, and yet perceived by others via masking, 
miscommunication, and stigmatizing labeling. Patients’ feelings of shame, self-
consciousness, and objectification are common and often reported, and influence 
one’s self-perception of oneself as perceived by others.32 
To conclude, I suggest that a phenomenology of breathlessness can account 
for the richness and diversity of breathlessness experiences, and articulate the 
positive and unintended consequences of suffering. These consequences include 
the ways in which breathless patients adapt to their limitations, their increased 
resilience in the face of everyday adversity, and what Jonathan Haidt terms “post-
traumatic growth.”33 Breathlessness is a juncture of physiological, psychological, 
existential, spiritual, and cultural dimensions. It cannot be studied solely as a 
symptom but requires a rich phenomenological account that makes room for 
the possibility of wellness within the constraints of breathlessness. As I hope to 
have shown here, a phenomenological framework can provide the conceptual 
tools required to fill this need.
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